• Given no generally accepted framework for financial stability, policymakers in developing Asia need to manage, not avoid, financial deepening.
• This paper supports Asian policymakers' judgement through analysis of the recent events in the United States and Europe and of earlier crisis episodes, including Asia during the 1990s. There is no simple linear relationship between financial repression and stability -financial repression not only has costs but, so doing can itself undermine stability.
• Bank-centric financial systems are not inherently safer than systems that include meaningful roles for securities and capital markets. Domestic financial systems should be steadily diversified in terms of both number of domestic competitors and types of savings and lending instruments available (and thus probably types of institutions). Financial repression should be focused on regulating the activities of financial intermediaries, not on compressing interest rates for domestic savers. Cross-border lending should primarily involve creation of multinational banks' subsidiaries in the local economy -and local currency lending and bond issuance should be encouraged. Macroprudential tools can be useful, and, if anything, are more effective in less open or less financially deep economies than in more advanced financial centres.
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Developing Asia faces a much greater intellectual and policy challenge on the financial side of the economy than on the real side (ie the side concerned with producing goods and services). There is pretty clear consensus and even a roadmap for the trade and investment side of the spectacular East Asian development stories over the last 60 years. These were largely based on integration with global markets and value chains under rules that have been framed mostly by the United States and Western Europe. In the financial area, however, there is no such clear consensus.
A number of Asian countries, including Japan, the Republic of Korea, and Singapore, succeeded while pursuing a different path than the United States and United Kingdom on the treatment of household savings and maintaining limits on financial development. The excesses of Anglo-American financial liberalisation being the apparent cause of the North Atlantic financial crisis of 2008-11 only deepened their caution.
Major failures in risk management were identified in the rich Western countries, in both the public and private sectors. The understanding of financial linkages and of the system as a whole by relevant public authorities was inadequate (Gorton 2009), as was their prudential supervision of many individual financial firms. Financial innovation was associated with opacity, instability, and a potentially nefarious "shadow banking system" (Pozsar et al, 2010) . These failures were an echo of those that caused the Asian financial crisis of 1997-98, though in both crises the message was exaggerated and oversimplified (Rhee and Posen 2013 ).
Yet, a number of Asian countries have wanted to create internationally competitive financial centres within their borders, which also require high levels of liberalisation and financial innovation. Key elements of this effort included the development of market-based finance in the form of tradable equities, bonds, and even instruments of risk transfer such as derivatives and securitisation; a deepening of international financial integration, associated with the elimination of cross-border capital controls and the adoption of common financial standards; and the creation of strong, competent, and independent institutions for financial sector oversight, within existing central banks or as autonomous agencies. Furthermore, the recent crisis notwithstanding, there is substantial evidence that financial repression imposes direct costs, if not outright limits, on broader economic development (Cline, 2010) , and, as demonstrated by the summer 2015 equity market developments in the People' s Republic of China (PRC), can itself contribute to financial instability 1 .
Simultaneously, the elevation of the Group of Twenty (G-20) to its new status as "premier forum for international economic cooperation" among its member constituencies 2 , with an initial strong emphasis on financial regulatory matters (Rottier and Véron, 2010) , was intended to send a message that a new 1 Mikitani and Posen (2001) The message, however, promised more than the G-20 could realistically deliver. As a result, the policy guidance for enhancing financial stability remains unsettled -and arguably deficient in terms of addressing the specific needs of emerging markets and nonbank activities.
In particular, the new G-20-centered framework' s goal of providing more balance among developing, emerging-market, and advanced economies in shaping common global financial policies has not yet been fully realised. On the positive side, the membership of key bodies such as the Financial Stability Board (FSB), Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS), or Committee on the Global Financial System (CGFS) has been significantly rebalanced to better represent Asian jurisdictions (as described below in the section on Cross-Border Integration). For reasons that involve both emerging-market and incumbent advanced economies, though, the influence of non-Western members of such bodies in their workings and outcomes is often less than the weight of those members' formal representation -and that is the case at the FSB (Véron, 2014; Walter, 2015) .
In the absence of a generally accepted framework for financial stability, policymakers in developing Asia need to exercise judgment while determining which choices are best suited to their specific situation. The most important point is that there is no simple linear relationship between financial repression and stability -postponing or avoiding financial liberalisation not only has costs but so doing can itself undermine systemic stability in developing economies. That fact holds, even though it is undeniable that Anglo-American light-touch financial regulation and supervision were destabilising and warn us to avoid extreme deregulation. We offer the following guidelines for policymakers pursuing financial stability in developing Asia:
• Bank-based or bank-centric financial systems are not inherently safer than systems that include meaningful roles for securities and capital markets.
• Domestic financial systems should be steadily diversified in terms of both number of domestic competitors and types of saving and lending instruments available (and thus probably types of institutions).
• Financial repression should be focused on regulating the activities of financial intermediaries and investment managers/funds, not on compressing interest rates and returns for domestic savers.
• Cross-border lending from regional financial centres in foreign currency should be in limited quantities only for top companies, but creation of multinational banks' subsidiaries in the local economy -and local currency lending and bond issuance -should be encouraged.
• Macroprudential tools can be useful and, if anything, are more effective in less open or less financially deep economies than in more advanced financial entrepots, but they must be used aggressively when needed and are particularly suited for dealing with real estate booms/busts.
The next four sections develop these ideas in more detail for banking, nonbank finance, macroprudential policy, and cross-border issues. This paper aims at supporting Asian policymakers' judgment by providing policy views and recommendations that are based on our analysis of the recent sequence of events in the United States and Europe and of earlier crisis episodes, including those in Asia (including Japan) during the 1990s. The last section synthesises the commonalities between developing Asia and some of these advanced-economy crises.
BANKING POLICY
Banks are the backbone of the financial system in most developing Asian countries and will remain so for the foreseeable future. Thus, banking policy will remain fundamental to shaping the financial system and ensuring financial stability.
In almost all cases, this policy should aim at fostering market mechanisms in the functioning of the banking system, especially the setting of interest rates for saving and borrowing and competition among banks. It is natural for governments everywhere to be tempted to distort the functioning of the financial system to facilitate the financing of their own operations or of specific economic activities or agents that they favour, a stance that the economic jargon loosely refers to as 'financial repression'. But this temptation of financial repression should be resisted in most circumstances, except during wars or other acute and temporary national emergencies. Specifically, the compression of interest rates offered to savers through a combination of capital controls and constraints on domestic banks -a common form of financial repression -is typically destabilising, because it encourages savers to find their way around the interest rate caps with harmful unintended consequences. The PRC over the past decade offers a relevant illustration of this mechanism, in which the repression of savings has encouraged both unproductive overinvestment and the build-up of financial risk in the "shadow banking" sector (Lardy, 2014).
Financial repression also exists under different forms in advanced countries, and its track record there is no more compelling than in less wealthy countries. The experience of the European Union offers a cautionary tale. Many EU member states entered the crisis of the late 2000s with a legacy of policies that included:
• Significant levels of public ownership of banks (at the national or local government level);
• Other levers of government influence to direct lending, such as tax loopholes and tweaks in regulatory requirements, eg the now notorious practice of assigning a zero risk-weight to all EU sovereign debt;
• Sector-specific accounting, auditing, and disclosure frameworks and practices;
• Curbs on nonbank finance, eg the prohibition of activities such as leasing and factoring without a banking license, which enhanced the dominance of banking intermediation; and
• Selective or complacent enforcement of competition policy in the banking sector.
The detail of these cases of "financial repression with European characteristics" varied across EU countries.
Overall, they significantly contributed to the systemic banking fragility that has been plaguing European growth since the initial shock of 2007-08.
The need for competition and market-based price setting and credit allocation, however, should not offset the equally important need for proper bank regulation. Banks are inherently leveraged institutions, and, because they collect deposits, are repositories of trust in society. In addition, the services they provide are rife with asymmetries of information, which no amount of public financial education can adequately check.
As a consequence, the regulation and supervision of banks by public authorities is a vital condition for financial stability and efficient financing of the economy.
The public-interest nature of depository institutions is one of the reasons why many countries have brought significant swaths of their banking system under public ownership. This is by no means unique to In developing and emerging-market economies, however, the separation between banking and commerce is often porous to non-existent. In many such countries, established families or groups with multiple business interests are the only non-state stakeholders that can provide the necessary financial and reputational capital to establish successful banks. This arguably justifies the recent initiatives in both the PRC and India to grant new bank licenses to existing corporate groups to check state-owned banking behemoths.
Even in advanced economies, the separation is seldom absolute. For example, several European automotive manufacturers have large credit-financing arms that are considered banks under EU legislation (even though they do not collect deposits), and in the United States, automakers and industrial equipment suppliers like GE had long maintained a sizeable quasi-bank financial arm. Policymakers in developing Asia, however, should remain acutely aware of the vast potential for conflicts of interest that exists when a bank is part of a broader commercial or industrial group. This is also true in the context of new internetbased financial services, which are often 'bundled' with non-financial commercial offerings. While such bundling may represent an attractive and efficient proposition for consumers, it should be subject to adequate supervision.
A separate policy debate refers to the possible separation, within financial groups, of different types of financial activities and particularly of commercial and investment banking. In the United States, the GlassSteagall Act of 1934 introduced such a stark separation, which was repealed in 1999, arguably to ill effect.
Similarly in the United Kingdom, merchant banks were kept separate from commercial banks until the deregulation of the 1980s and 1990s. Similar provisions have existed or still exist in several Asian countries such as the PRC, India, Japan, and the Republic of Korea. For example, in the PRC, banks are prohibited from equities brokerage, which is the sole preserve of securities firms under a separate regulator. Following the recent financial crisis, the public anger against bailouts of large banks has led to the introduction or reintroduction of legal constraints on the structure of banking groups in the United
States and Europe. These include the Volcker rule, which aims at prohibiting proprietary trading by banks in the United States; the Vickers reform in the United Kingdom, which mandates the ring-fencing of retail and commercial banking operations from other financial services; and EU legislation on banking structural reform, which, however, is still under discussion at the time of writing.
While mantras such as "banks should not be allowed to speculate with household deposits" resonate with politicians and the general public, however, a more in-depth analysis suggests caution against simplistic solutions of separation. The legal definition of ' speculation' as opposed to hedging or market-making has proved elusive, and the highly complex implementation of the Volcker rule does not appear to satisfy its initial promoters more than its critics. Similarly, the spread of credit-transfer techniques such as derivatives has irreversibly blurred the boundary between commercial and wholesale banking, and it is not evident that the distinction has much substance from a systemic risk perspective.
That said, some principles of separation appear necessary and healthy. Insurance operations in a broader financial group should be conducted in a separate subsidiary with its own capital. Asset management activities also require separation, in order to ensure that funds under a bank' s custody are not confused with those under the bank' s direct ownership. Furthermore, some structural measures may be necessary to ensure or facilitate a bank' s resolution in the event of failure (see below on resolution). But these may be better left to the judgment of supervisors, and thus tailored to the specific situation of each banking group, than defined uniformly in legislation. The Basel III framework has occasionally been criticised for being ill suited for developing or emergingmarket economies and for excessively constraining, for example, bank lending to small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs). The Basel calibrations, however, have taken into account observations from across the BCBS membership, including emerging-market economies. The critique of the impact on SME lending has been acute in Europe as well, leading to deviations from Basel III in setting capital charges for loans to SMEs in the legislation that transposes Basel III into EU law, known as the Capital Requirements Regulation (CRR).
This is a significant reason for the low grading of the European Union under RCAP as materially noncompliant. In reality, lending to SMEs is inherently risky and the artificial reduction of the corresponding capital charges, as in CRR, represents a questionable distortion of the prudential framework.
In any case, the Basel framework is intended only for larger internationally active banks. In general, developing Asian countries should aim at such large banks' compliance with Basel III while engaging actively with the BCBS standard-setting process in order to ensure that it fairly takes into account the realities of all jurisdictions. The Basel III standards on bank capital and leverage, and the complementary standards from the FSB on additional requirements on systemically important financial institutions (SIFIs) and total loss-absorbing capacity (TLAC) requirements currently under discussion, are based on longstanding experience with capital requirements. Many aspects remain hotly debated, including the principle of measuring capital ratios against risk-weighted assets; nevertheless, the framework can in general terms be considered tried and tested, and broadly balanced.
By contrast, the parts of Basel III that deal with liquidity issues are more experimental in nature and subject to more uncertainty as to their possible unintended consequences. These include the liquidity coverage ratio (LCR), aimed at ensuring resilience against a temporary liquidity shock, and the net stable funding ratio (NSFR), aimed at ensuring ongoing sustainability of a bank' s funding structure. The LCR is still in a period of phasing-in that will be completed only in early 2019 (BCBS, 2013) . The definition of the NSFR was finalised only in October 2014, and its introduction is planned for early 2018 (BCBS, 2014) . Countries in developing Asia, especially those that are not BCBS members, have no need to rush into implementation of these measures and may gain from observing their early implementation in other jurisdictions.
For all its importance, regulation is only one part of the banking policy framework and must be complemented with effective arrangements for supervision and crisis management. In spite of some improvement, bank supervision capacity remains constrained in many developing Asian countries. To be effective, supervision must be based on an in-depth analysis of risk in the banks' balance sheets and their environment and not just on the formulaic application of prudential ratios. Capacity constraints make it particularly important to complement supervision with an effective framework for market discipline, based on strong standards for accounting, auditing, and supervisory disclosures (the so-called third pillar of the Basel framework). Similarly, stress testing has emerged as an increasingly prominent component of the supervisory toolkit (Goldstein 2015) but also requires the build-up of adequate capacity.
Resolution frameworks are an even more challenging issue for many developing and emerging-market A predictable resolution system, however, involves a lot of prerequisites in terms of the rule of law, functioning court system (because the resolution process is always defined with reference to the alternative of court-ordered insolvency), and the administrative capacity of the resolution authority itself.
Even in the United States, the operation of the Dodd-Frank Act of 2010 in the case of future crises involving systemically important financial institutions remains entirely to be tested. As a consequence, developing
Asian countries should put emphasis on crisis prevention rather than resolution and carefully observe developments in other jurisdictions to optimise their capacity to respond to future banking crises.
The creation of a credible system for deposit insurance is another component of bank crisis management frameworks. The specific features of deposit insurance schemes are important to ensure effectiveness, and poorly designed systems can be detrimental rather than beneficial to financial stability (Demirgüç- build-up of adequate capacity and credibility is crucial to the effectiveness of the policy framework.
A proper competition policy is also important in the banking sector, which is prone to concentration of market power in a limited number of dominant banks that benefit from an implicit ' too big to fail' guarantee.
Local credit unions, cooperatives, and micro-lending institutions often play a vital role in financing small businesses and job creation in developing economies as in advanced ones. Public authorities should ensure that the environment does not prevent their development, while simultaneously refraining from giving them special competitive privileges.
In banking as in other economic sectors, new technology is disrupting the competitive landscape, fostering Because developing countries in Asia and other regions are less encumbered with legacy systems, they can often adopt such new technologies quickly and can thus 'leapfrog' services or practices that are more widespread in advanced economies but are rapidly becoming obsolete. Technology-enabled access to financial services, including on a cross-border basis, may increase the cost of financial repression and reduce its effectiveness. The disruption of finance by these technologies has barely started, and it is not possible at this early stage to predict its future intensity and the exact challenges it will entail. What is already clear, however, is that public authorities in developing Asia and elsewhere need to devote appropriate resources to monitor financial technology developments in real time and understand what these developments mean for them.
NONBANK FINANCE
The Asian financial crisis of 1997-98 memorably led the then chairman of the US Federal Reserve to observe: "Before the crisis broke, there was little reason to question the three decades of phenomenally solid East Asian economic growth, largely financed through the banking system. The rapidly expanding economies and bank credit growth kept the ratio of nonperforming loans to total bank assets low. The failure to have backup forms of intermediation was of little consequence. The lack of a spare tire is of no concern if you do not get a flat. East Asia had no spare tires"
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. Since then, countries in developing Asia and elsewhere have endeavoured to develop bond markets and local-currency issuance (Goswani and Sharma, 2011). In the PRC, some diversification away from a purely bank-dominated system has been achieved through the toleration by public authorities of the rapid development of "shadow" finance (Borst and Lardy, 2015) . The concern to develop nonbank finance is by no means limited to Asia. In the European Union, the European Commission has similarly announced an agenda of 'capital markets union', even though its exact content has not yet been determined (European Commission, 2015) .
The development of nonbank finance has a two-pronged rationale. First, the ' spare tyre' argument holds that alternative financing channels can take the baton of credit provision when banks need to deleverage and restructure themselves, which typically happens after a systemic crisis. Furthermore, capital markets, particularly their equity component, provide a powerful mechanism for risk sharing across regions (Asdrubali, Sørensen and Yosha, 1996; IMF, 2013) . As in natural ecosystems, diversity of the financial system is a factor of resilience and stability. Second, capital markets and the nonbank sector offer forms of financing that are better suited than bank lending to support specific patterns of development, especially service innovators and other high-growth companies that do not have tangible assets to pledge as collateral (Philippon and Véro,n 2008). Thus, the development of nonbank finance enhances the economy' s growth potential and counts as a form of structural reform.
These arguments are generally compelling when applied to advanced economies such as the European Union (Véron and Wolff, 2015; Langfield and Pagano, 2015) . In developing economies, their relevance has to be assessed against each country' s specific context. Even well-developed local-currency bond markets primarily benefit larger companies. Corporate loan securitisation is unsuited to lending to small companies, because the costs associated with the required documentation and corresponding corporate transparency are prohibitively high: Even in the world' s most developed securitisation market, the United States, the volumes of SME loan securitisation are low. Thus, countries where SMEs carry out most of the business activity will struggle to establish vibrant national capital markets. These countries might benefit more from opening up to cross-border capital flows to favour external -but not necessarily foreign currency -financing of their highest-potential companies through foreign intermediaries rather than domestic ones (see section on Cross-Border Integration).
The development of the Chinese shadow banking sector also offers an important reference point for developing Asia. Given the sector' s generally insufficient transparency, it is difficult at the time of writing to form firm opinions about its medium-term economic impact. the risk it represents for overall systemic stability. Nevertheless, the authorities appear to have reached the conclusion that, even if it does put competitive pressure on the incumbent banks, the shadow banking system cannot be allowed to grow unchecked. The lack of data makes it difficult to evaluate the contribution of the PRC' s shadow banking system to nonfinancial corporate financing at this point, but in any case, it is unlikely to grow as dynamically as it has in the last few years. Furthermore, the unique size of the PRC economy and internal market means that its experience cannot be directly replicated in other countries of developing Asia.
Dynamic capital markets and nonbank finance can be very beneficial to the economy if they function properly, as the example of the United States illustrates. But to function properly, they have to meet a number of conditions. In particular, insolvency and debt restructuring frameworks are essential components of the intangible infrastructure that supports them. In countries where insolvency processes are either inefficient or easily hijacked by special interests or both, riskier forms of nonbank credit (such as high-yield bonds, securitisation or mezzanine credit) are likely to be difficult to introduce, because of the lack of underlying trust that creditors' interests will be suitably defended in case the supported venture is not successful.
Similarly, equity markets and several segments of nonbank credit markets require a high standard of Hong Kong, China; the Republic of Korea; Malaysia; the Maldives; Mongolia; Nepal; Singapore; and Taipei, China, among others. Furthermore Bangladesh, Myanmar, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, and Uzbekistan are using standards that differ from IFRS only on a limited number of points, while the PRC, India, Indonesia, Japan, and Thailand have for the moment retained national accounting standards even though these are partly modelled on the IFRS (Pacter, 2015) . In any event, accounting standards are only one part of a robust corporate financial reporting framework. Equally important are the requirements and practices that govern auditing and the enforcement of accounting standards by public authorities (generally securities markets regulators). On both these dimensions, and despite the near total absence of reliable comparative data, it appears that most developing Asian countries have significant potential for progress.
Financial ecosystems change only slowly. In their ambition to foster financial development and particularly the expansion of nonbank finance, policymakers in developing Asia should resist the temptation to artificially accelerate the financial evolutionary process by subsidising market segments that they see as desirable or granting them special tax or regulatory privileges. This is particularly true in the area of venture capital (VC), a segment that many governments in developing, emerging-market, and advanced economies alike view as disproportionately beneficial to the economy because it is associated with innovative, high-growth firms, including disruptive technological innovators.
In Europe, for example, a number of governments have intervened directly in the VC market, by setting up public funds that either invest in private sector VC funds or invest directly in companies, alone or in coinvestment with private sector VC funds. Many such funds exist in Europe at the subnational, national, and
European levels (the European Investment Fund is managed by the European Investment Bank). Generally speaking, the track record of these funds is poor, and there is even evidence that they represent a drag rather than a stimulant for the growth of a healthy VC sector (Veugelers, 2011 ). It appears that the stringent control mechanisms that are inherent in the deployment of public money are incompatible with the highrisk, high-failure-rate, judgment-based approach that defines VC investment. Developing Asian countries should learn from the European failures in this area. Rather than throwing scarce public money at the sector, they should focus on the environment that shapes VC activity, including the quality of higher education, predictability of tax and regulatory developments, protection of intellectual property rights, openness to foreign investment, and integrity of the justice system.
All things considered, the potential for nonbank finance in developing Asia depends heavily on each country' s specific context of financial, economic, and institutional development. For some, a home-grown nonbank financial sector with critical mass can provide benefits in terms of both higher growth potential and higher stability; for other countries, it is more promising to become more open to financing from outside by pursuing cross-border financial integration (see section on Cross-Border Integration). Banks will continue to play an irreplaceable role in the financing of the economy in all Asian countries.
MACROPRUDENTIAL TOOLS AND THEIR USE
Macroprudential policy concepts have evolved gradually since the 1970s from the realisation that the regulation and supervision of individual financial firms may not always be sufficient to ensure the stability of the financial system as a whole (Borio, 2003; Clement, 2010) . The corresponding instruments include, in particular, loan-to-value (LTV) limits, countercyclical capital buffers and time-varying reserve requirements, and targeted taxes and levies on financial activities. The existence of a track record varies depending on the instrument: Some measures have been used long before being given a ' macroprudential' label, the use of which has become significantly more widespread over the last decade; others are largely or entirely untested.
The dataset of past macroprudential actions assembled by Longmei Zhang and Edda Zoli (2014) suggests that Asian countries have a higher propensity to engage in such measures than jurisdictions in other regions (Figure 2 ). This dataset establishes a distinction between macroprudential policies and capital flow management (CFM) measures, which are occasionally associated with a macroprudential objective. The same source identifies a marked increase in CFM measures in Asia following the peak of the financial crisis in late 2008 but at a pace that is far lower than that of the Latin American region, which leads in this category.
Macroprudential measures, of course, distort the operation of market mechanisms and in principle should be introduced only in response to a specifically identified market failure. The absence of relevant general equilibrium economic models of financial systems, however, implies that there is a strong heuristic element in the elaboration of such measures, which itself is made more challenging by the difficulty of assessing their effectiveness in terms of both benefits and costs (Claessens, 2014).
The area in which macroprudential measures appear to have had the most compelling record of effectiveness is in real estate booms and busts. Such booms and busts are one of the major drivers of systemic financial crises, as illustrated in recent years by the United States but also by several European countries including Ireland, Spain, and the Baltic countries. Developing Asian countries should introduce macroprudential tools to dampen property booms, or maintain and refine them if they already have (Jeanne 2014) . Beyond this sector-specific aspect, there is a case for being cautious -developing status and absence of a globalised financial centre in this instance can be a virtue, as most asset price booms with systemic implications will be confined largely to real estate (whether commercial or residential).
In any event, it is important for all Asian countries, as in the rest of the world, to devote resources to better monitor and understand developments in their financial system beyond the banking sector. These include the timely collection and publication of statistics. 
CROSS-BORDER INTEGRATION
Financial stability frameworks are not purely domestic, since cross-border financial integration affects all countries at least to a certain extent. The impact of such integration on stability, however, is ambiguous and easy to misunderstand. Generally speaking, the judgment of national authorities is inherently skewed in this area, as they tend to view and treat home-grown risks that arise under their watch more leniently than risks coming from abroad. A quintessential example of this bias was offered by European prudential authorities in the first few years of the recent financial crisis, which they blamed on the United States without an in-depth examination of why European banks had ended up with an aggregate exposure to the US subprime market risk that was equal to if not larger than that of American banks (IMF, 2009) . It took an unjustifiably long time for these authorities to finally admit that faulty risk management systems and inadequate incentives, not just cross-border financial integration, had played an essential part in the corresponding build-up of risk in European banks' balance sheets and that these could and should be primarily Singapore and Hong Kong, China, rather than trying to create international financial centres of their own -a seductive objective for many developing countries but that more often than not results in costly failure to reach critical mass and attract international market participants.
In Asia, financial integration lags compared with economic integration more broadly, and the level of financial integration is typically higher with non-Asian countries than inside the region (Kim and Lee, 2008; Borensztein and Loungani, 2011; Pongsaparn and Unteroberdoerster, 2011) . This suggests a significant scope for allowing more cross-border financial services and investment without creating a risk to financial done better in responding to their crises had they adhered to the recommendations they made to Asia a decade earlier (Rhee and Posen, 2013) . Of course, financial stability and development are more than matters of crisis response, so the common threads are a little less obvious than avoiding throwing good money after bad and injecting capital where necessary.
We believe the most important parallel with respect to financial stability between the recent advanced economies' experience and the challenges facing Asian policymakers is the repeated failure of financial repression to provide stability. Across southern Europe even in recent years, and earlier in the American 'heartland' and among the mid-sized banks in Japan, various forms of financial repression bottling up household savings in protected financial institutions were widespread -and instability still befell these economies. While the recent North Atlantic financial developments were importantly worsened by too big to fail distortions, in Europe in the 2010s, like in Japan in the 1990s and the United States in the 1980s, most of the problems were generated in and on the balance sheets of government-guaranteed smaller financial institutions (Goldstein and Véron, 2011; Mikitani and Posen, 2001 ). Similarly, cross-border capital flows also played a huge part in the build-up of unsustainable lending -be it in Greece or Nevada, Ireland or Florida -but those destabilising inflows took place across a wide variety of exchange rate regimes, levels of development, and even domestic financial institutions.
Because there is no simple positive correlation between financial liberalisation and instability, the optimal policy approach is not about achieving a lukewarm compromise between repression and liberalisation. We have offered a few specific suggestions for Asian policymakers about how to implement a balanced strategy in practice. These general principles can be followed at most stages of economic and financial development and are not complicated matters of sequencing or conditionality depending upon what form development has taken to date.
This wide applicability comes from the fact that financial stability ultimately stems from having adequately varied sources of commercial credit and outlets for household savings, so that fragility -or even mismanagement or supervisory capture -of one piece of the system does not bring down the economy' s whole framework. The greater depth and diversity of the US financial system versus the UK concentrated banking development meant the former contributed to a much better and more rapid recovery from crisis than was seen in the latter 7 . A similar argument could be made for Singapore versus some other smaller East -what matters is the resilience of provision of financial services to the economy, which is better served by multiple players in type and number 9 .
Second, we recommend that financial repression be limited to those measures that can be equally characterised as strong prudential regulation -that put the focus on financial sector activities, the most destabilising of which can be identified and restricted. So doing takes away the focus on restricting the location and investment vehicles of household savers. Bad financial repression of the sort focused on bottling up savings to subsidise lending is actually destabilising for economies at all levels of development. Interest rate compression will lead to increasingly frantic efforts by savers to get around limits and even border controls, which will result in speculative bursts in limited asset classes to potentially great harm. Arguably, this is the source of the market instability and the real estate downturn in the PRC in 2015.
Low interest rates or a large gap between what savers get and borrowers pay from what the market rate would be are not only an inefficient, often politicised, way to allocate resources but also contrary to financial stability goals. Again, a sensible set of policies includes strong regulatory oversight of financial activities without having to resort to either full-on liberalisation or ongoing financial repression.
Third, policymakers should carefully monitor the potential impact of the use of new information technology in finance in the next few years. While banks and other financial firms have not been subject to as much technology-based change as other sectors for the moment, such change is likely to become increasingly prominent as the potential of mobile services in finance is operationalised. The development of a datacentric culture, together with enhanced public transparency about financial firms and systems in compliance with international data standards, can help prepare for future disruptions. This is a situation where diversity and entry by new players can rapidly be taken too far, and some consumer protection as well as supervision is called for. In this area as well, there is room to distinguish between leapfrogging past constraints via mobile and internet in terms of payment systems, including government disbursement, which should be encouraged, and allowing a free-for-all in internet-driven trading and investment offers, which should not.
Asian policymakers need to develop an information and supervisory infrastructure that keeps pace with development -something that actually is feasible, so long as best practices can be imported and advised and so long as the presumption is ' allow but only within the tent'. Similar to the old saying ' trust but verify' , this means that policymakers concerned about financial stability can indicate that they are always open to new products and providers, but only so long as those new offers are under some form of disclosure, monitoring, and clear accountability for losses.
Less financially developed economies whose policymakers eschew financial fads and national champion banks can actually benefit from not having to be at the innovative cutting edge. There is little cost to the economy from using blunter tools than sometimes are available in the most advanced markets and from requiring all financial sector-like developments to be centrally monitored. Disputes over the cost of regulating financial innovation, and the risks that go with excessive game playing, can be left to the handful of global financial centres -so long as the policymaker of developing Asia is committed to ongoing relative innovation, that is bringing the domestic financial sector along toward the frontier of deepening markets. A similar argument is valid for the use of macroprudential tools in terms of blunt instruments to temper large sustained asset price swings: So long as the underlying and general commitment is to market-determined asset prices, financial and monetary policymakers need not worry about the occasional use of overwhelming force to stem, say, real estate bubbles fuelled by foreign capital (as in fact a number of Asian authorities are rightly doing at the moment). In a less developed financial system, such tools should be more effective than in economies where financial innovation and globalisation shields some financial activities from macroprudential policies' reach. That should give Asian policymakers the confidence to continue to pursue financial development, just not at breakneck speed.
